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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000379

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [ASEC](#) [KDEM](#) [EFIN](#) [GV](#)

SUBJECT: SIRTE COMMUNIQUE ON GUINEA REFLECTS LOCAL CONTACT
GROUP'S TOUGHENED STANCE ON ELECTIONS

REF: A. CONAKRY 319

[1](#)B. CONAKRY 363

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kent C. Brokenshire for Reason 1.4 B/D

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: The final communique from the International Contact Group on Guinea meeting in Sirte, Libya, is an almost verbatim version of the communique circulated by the Conakry-based local contact group on June 19, possibly indicating a more robust approach by the Chambas-led organization. The local international contact group's widely disseminated communique outlined its dismay with a lack of democratic progress in Guinea and called for greater engagement by the Guinean Government. The Conakry communique was purposely made public to keep Chambas from veiling its message in more appeasing tones. It also marks the culmination of months of frustration at what is widely viewed as a soft and largely ineffective approach by Chambas and Contact Group co-chair Abrahima Fall in dealing with the political crisis in Guinea. End Summary.

A COMMON APPROACH

[1](#)2. (C) Prior to the local contact group's formal meeting, representatives of G-8 countries with missions in Guinea met at US Charge Raspolic's residence to discuss a common approach. The group included Chiefs of Mission from the U.S., France, UK, Japan, Russia, as well as the EU, Spain and the World Bank. (Note: Most of these COMs also represent their countries on the International Contact Group for Guinea (ICG-G) when it meets in Conakry. End Note) The group voiced its overall displeasure with the way the ICG-G was proceeding. It was particularly concerned that ICG-G Chairman Mohamed Ibn Chambas and Co-Chair Fall were not delivering to Guinea's military junta the group's deep concern and frustration over the lack of progress on elections. The local contact group ended the meeting resolved to send an unambiguous message to Chambas.

TWO COMMUNIQUEES

[1](#)3. (U) The form of this message was the first item of business when the local contact group met at the Nigerian Embassy in Conakry June 18-19. Fearing that Chambas would again downplay the group's general dismay over the lack of elections progress in Guinea, the group agreed to draft two documents: a public communique and a more detailed memorandum intended for Chambas. The purpose of the communique was to make clear to the GoG and Guinean public the extent of the group's concern over a range of issues. By going public with the communique, the local group also hoped to undercut any attempt by Chambas to soft-peddle the extent of the

international community's frustration over elections in Guinea. Chambas had the memorandum and communique in hand when he met with the ICG-G prior to the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya.

¶4. (U) Both the communique and the more detailed memorandum to Chambas and Fall grew out of two days of meetings between the local contact group and political parties, civil society, the head of the independent electoral commission, and the GoG, represented by the ministers of justice and territorial administration. Both documents note a lack of political dialogue, the GoG's unfulfilled commitments to help fund elections, the lack of access of political parties to state media as well as other points. The documents also noted the government's failure to act on its pledge to establish a National Transition Council.

¶5. (U) The Sirte communique of June 27 was an almost verbatim copy of the local contact group's message. It touched on the same principal themes, such as a lack of political dialogue in Guinea, the still unrealized National Transitional Council, and lack of freedom of expression and association. In addition, the Sirte communique also urged the military junta to make a financial contribution to the elections.

COMMENT

¶6. (C) Two dynamics emerged from the local contact group meeting in Conakry. The first is a tougher line from the G-8 countries in pressing the military junta for elections.

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France, Germany, and the EU, which initially advocated a more conciliatory approach toward the junta have largely abandoned this position for a tougher stance, something the U.S. has advocated since the first week of the coup. The second dynamic is a growing collective disillusion with Chambas. His insistence on exclusive meetings with junta leader Dadis Camara and his unwillingness to take a harder line in pressing the junta for elections have not yielded positive results. In five months he has accomplished nothing of significance and elections are nearly as far off today as in January. In the interim the military junta has grown accustomed to the trappings of power and appear increasingly reluctant to yield their new privileges to any civilian authority, elected or otherwise.

¶7. (U) The Sirte Communique was the most forceful expression to date from the ICG-G. However, it is unclear if it represents a new resolve on the part of Chambas and the international group or the simplest expedient in getting out a general message of concern.

RASPOLIC